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Anderson: Indian Law

INDIAN LAW
I. NAVAJO-HOPI CONFLICT AND THE APPLICATION
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW PRINCIPLES

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald 1 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit considered the conflicting claims of the Hopi
and Navajo Tribes to reservation lands that make up the northeast corner of the State of Arizona. The history of this intertribal conflict extends over several hundred years and has resulted in numerous actions in federal courts.2

The histories of the tribes are important for an appreciation
of the issues raised in Sekaquaptewa. The Hopi entered the contested area first, and by the 16th century had settled on portions
of the land in question, established pueblo villages, and successfully farmed the semi-arid Iand.3 The Navajo Tribe, a nomadic
people, apparently first entered the area during the 17th century
and initiated raids on Hopi settlements which continued
through the 19th century." Protected by their fortress-like pueblos, the Hopi endured the occasional depredations of the larger
and more aggressive Navajo Tribe and continued their agrarian
lifestyle. 1I
1. 619 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Skopil, J.; the other panel members were Anderson, J., and Bonsal, D.J.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 565 (Dec. 1980).
2. See 619 F.2d 801, 803 (1980); Sekaquaptewa v. McDonald, 591 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.
1979); Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 448 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Ariz. 1978); all pertaining to
the Act of 1934. See also Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 575 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1978);
Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 544 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1976); Hamilton v. MacDonald, 503
F.2d 1138 (9th Cir. 1974); Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1972); Healing v.
Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ariz. 1962), aff'd, 373 U.S. 758 (1963); all of which pertain to
the 1882 Executive Order.
3. Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 134 (D. Ariz. 1862), aff'd, 373 U.S. 758 (1963).
See F. WALTERS, BOOK OF THE HOPI (1963), for a general history of the religious and
social development of the Hopi Tribe.
4. Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 134-35, 146-48 (D. Ariz. 1962), aff'd, 373 U.S.
758 (1963). See also J. 'rERRELL, THE NAVAJO 80 (1970).
5. Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 134, 145. (D. Ariz. 1962), aff'd, 373 U.S. 758
(1963).
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The coming of white settlers into the southwest, particularly
to New Mexico where the Navajo were principally located, dramatically changed the Navajo lifestyle.s In 1864, the United
States Army defeated the Navajo in a major "Indian War," and
confined a large portion of the tribe for several years at Fort
Defiance, near the Arizona-New Mexico border.7 In 1868 the tribal representatives signed a treaty with the United States8
which required other bands of the tribe then in southern New
Mexico to rejoin the tribe on land set aside for tribal use near
Fort Definance.9 The Navajo attempted to resume their traditional nomadic lifestyle, and began to move west into Hopi
territory.
B.

LEGAL HISTORY

The Treaty of 1868 between the United States and the Navajo granted the tribe reservation land in the northwest corner of
New Mexico and the northeast corner of Arizona. This treaty
placed the Navajo on the eastern boundary of the Hopi-claimed
lands. Although the treaty restricted the Navajo to their reservation, the Army paid little attention to the Navajo's western incursions into Hopi-held land.1o No action was taken in response
to repeated requests by local Indian agents for the Secretary of
the Interior to remove the Navajo from Hopi lands and to establish permanent boundaries between the tribes.l l
In 1882, by Executive Order, the United States set aside a
tract from public lands expressly "for the use and occupancy of
the Moqui [Hopi] and such other Indians as the Secretary of the
Interior may see fit to settle thereon."12 Despite this specific al6. Id. at 134-37.
7. Id. at 135.
8. Treaty With the Navajo Indians, June I, 1861, art. xm, 15 Stat. 667 (1934)
("The tribe herein named, by their representatives, parties to this treaty, agree to make
the reservation herein described their permanent home, and they will not as a tribe make
any permanent settlement elsewhere . • . .").
9. Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 134 (D. Ariz. 1962).
10. Id. at 135-37.
11. Id. at 146-50.
12. EXEC. ORDER of Dec. 16, 1882, reprinted in 1 C. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS LAWS
AND TREATIES 805 (1904) ("It is hereby ordered that the tract of country . . . is hereby,
withdrawn from settlement and sale, and set apart for the use and occupancy of the
Moqui [Hopi] and such other Indians as the Secretary of the Interior may see fit to settle
thereon.").
The term "Moqui" is It Navajo term meaning "dead one" and was used by the In-
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location, the Navajo continued to settle in and around the area
of the Hopi Reservation. Subsequent to the establishment of the
Navajo Reservation of 1868 and the Hopi Reservation of 1882,
executive orders set aside additional tracts of public land for Indian use. 13 Several of these orders expressly added the new lands
to' the Navajo Reservation; others designated the lands only for
"Indian purposes."!"' As these tracts were added to the reservations, the tribes remained in conflict over what the Hopi considered to be Navajo encroachment on Hopi lands, and what the
Navajo considered to the Hopi settlement on lands granted to
the Navajo.lI5
In the 1930's, the basic philosophy of federal-Indian relations changed dramatically. The Indian Reorganization Act of
1934 marked the end of allotment of tribal lands to individual
tribal members and the beginning of encouragement of tribal reorganization and self-reliance. Ie During this time, Congress
passed the Act of June 14, 19341'1 to consolidate title to the various reservation lands in that section of Arizona described in the
Act and to define the final limits of reservation expansion in
that area.
The Hopi Reservation of 1882 was explicitly excluded from
the 1934 Act to ease Hopi fears of becoming completely dominated by the Navajo Tribe.18 In addition, the Hopi were assured
that the 1934 Act was phi-ased to protect their interests in tribal
dian Office until 1923. L. KELLy, TIm NAVA.JO INDIANS AND FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 19001935 (1970).
13. See Exec. Orders of Oct. 29, 1878, Jan. 6, 1880, May 17, 1884, Jan. 8, 1900,
reprinted in KAPPLER, supra note 12, at 876-77.
14. See note 12 supra. See, e.g., Exec. Order of Jan. 6, 1880, reprinted in, KAPPLER,
supra note 12, at 876 ("as an addition to the present Navajo Reservation •••• "); Exec.
Order of May 17, 1884, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra note 12, at 876 ("set apart as a
reservation for Indian purposes ••••").
15. See Los Angeles Times, Sept. 16, 1979, at 1, coL 1.
16. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1970). The major provisions of this Act restricted future allotment of Indian reservation land to any Indian,
provided funds to purchase land for landless Indians, empowered tribes to adopt democratic constitutions and by-laws, granted specific rights to tribes to incorporate and defined "Indian." For a discussion of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 and the Navajo, see KELLy, supra note 12, at 163.
17. Act of June 14, 1943, Pub. L. No. 352, 48 Stat. 960 (1934).
18. [d. ("nothing herein contained shall affect the existing status of the Moqui
[Hopi] Indian Reservation created by Executive Order of December 16, 1882."). See also
Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 448 F. Supp. at 1193-96.
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holdings which were outside of the 1882 reservation lands, but·
within the land affected by the 1934 Act. IS .
The authors of the 1934 Act anticipated that the two tribes
would eventually either work out their own boundaries or become integrated/olD By 1934 the tribal land holdings were widely
intermixed and created a quilt-work pattern of Navajo and Hopi
enclaves surrounded by land held by members of the other
tribe. 21 As the Navajo Tribe, with its significantly larger population, expanded, it exerted increasing pressure on the Hopi land
holdings.22 The tribes failed to negotiate any disposition of the
lands and conflict over settlements and the use of grazing lands
continued. In response to the tribes' failure, Congress authorized
federal court jurisdiction for a quiet title action between the two
tribes as to the 1882 reservation lands.2s
In Healing v. Jones,24 an action initiated by the Hopi Tribe,
the federal district court interpreted the phrase in the Executive
Order of 1882 "for the use and occupancy of the Moqui and such
other Indians as the Secretary of the Interior may see fit to set- .
tIe thereon,"25 as a grant to both the Hopi and Navajo Tribes.IB
The court found that the Navajo had been administratively settled on the 1882 reservation by federal acknowledgement and by
tolerance of the Navajo settlements on the Hopi Reservation.2'7
The district court, therefore, granted each tribe an undivided
one-half interest in the 1882 reservation, with the exception of a
small section found to be in the exclusive possession of the Hopi
Tribe.2B Healing, however, did not settle the dispute. The Hopi
complained that the Navajo did not honor the court's decisions.
Through a series of subsequent actions the Hopi attempted to
19. 448 F. Supp. at 1193-96.
20. Id. at 1195.
21. Id. at 1185.
22. From 1864 to 1970 the Navajo population increased from approximately 10,000
to over 120,000. G. BOYCE, WHEN NAVAJOS HAD Too MANY SHEEP at x (1974). Opening
Brief for Appellant at 70 n.26, Sekaquaptewa v_ MacDonald, 619 F.2d 801 (9th Cir.
1980).
23. Act of July 22, 1958, Pub. L. No. 95-531, 72 Stat. 403 (1958).
24. 210 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ariz. 1962), aff'd, 373 U.S. 758 (1963).
25. Exec. Order of Dec. 16, 1882, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra note 12, at 805.
26. 210 F. Supp. at 143-92.
27. Id. at 169.
28. Id. at 191-92.
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force implementation of the court's decision. 29
Similarly, both tribes continued to claim the area which surrounded the 1882 reservation and was described in the 1934 consolidation act.30 In response, Congress enacted the Jurisdictional
Act of 1974,31 which authorized the tribes to bring a quiet title
action in federal court.
On the basis of the Jurisdictional Act of 1974, the Hopi
Tribe brought a quiet title action against the Navajo Tribe. In
Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald,32 the federal district court determined what lands were included in the 1934 Act and the nature
and extent of the respective Hopi and Navajo land rights. The
court first determined that the purpose of the Act was to include
all of the executive order reservation additions within the Act's
boundaries. 33 The court found these reservation lands to be temporary withdrawals of public lands because they did not confer a
compensable title and were revocable at will.U
In the most critical element of the decision-the determination of the respective tribal land holdings-the court focused on
the legislative intent behind the Act. The court noted that the
legislative history was sparse and that only one congressional
hearing had been held, at which the minutes of several meetings
between Bureau of Indian Affairs administrators and Hopi village leaders had been added to the record. 35 At those meetings
the administrators assured the Hopi leaders that the wording in
the proposed act, "as may already be located thereon", had been
included to protect Hopi rights in the lands they occupied in
that area and that their rights to these lands would be undisturbed. 36 At the time of these meetings, the proposed bill also
included a provision authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to
set apart, from time to time, lands within the Navajo Reserva29. Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 575 F.2d 239 (9th eir. 1978); Sekaquaptewa v.
MacDonald, 544 F.2d 396 (9th eir. 1976); Hamilton v. McDonald, 503 F.2d 1138 (9th eir.
1974); Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152 (9th eir. 1972).
30. Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 619 F.2d at 801.
31. Act of Dec. 22, 1974; Pub. L. No. 95-531, 88 Stat. 1715 (1974).
32. 448 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Ariz. 1978).
33. Id. at 1189-91 n.7.
34. Id. at 1189.
35. Id. at 1193-95.
36. Id. at 1194.
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tion boundaries for the use of the H~pi. The district court noted,
however, that this provision had been excluded in the resulting
Act. 37 The court considered this deletion an indication of the
congressional intent to limit Hopi land interests.3s
From this interpretation, the district court found that the
Hopi Tribe held only an undivided one-half interest in land that
tribal members had used, occupied, or possessed prior to the enactment of the 1934 Act.39 Both tribes appealed the district
court's decision, and the Ninth Circuit accepted the appeal
under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b).·o
C.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered the respective Hopi
and Navajo property interests in the reservation land affected by
the 1934 Act, and whether the district court had jurisdiction to
consider the Hopi request for an accounting of Navajo activities
on land in which the Hopi Tribe had an interest."l
The Hopi Tribe argued that the district court's limitation of
Hopi land interests was contrary to the plain meaning and legislative history of the 1934 Act."2 They also contended that the
district court erred in deciding contrary to Healing v. Jones,·a
asserting that that case was precedent for this dispute, and that
the decision conflicted with real property law principles."·
The Navajo Trilbe contended that not all executive order
reservations were meant to be included in the 1934 Act. They
argued that the 1900 Executive Order's withdrawal of public
land was intended to be a permanent part of the Navajo Reservation, and that the district court erred in holding that it represented only a tempolrary withdrawal of public land."15
37. ld. at 1195-96.
38. ld. at 1196.
39.ld.
40. 619 F.2d at 803.
41. ld. at 804.
42. ld. at 806; see also Opening Brief for Appellant at 15-19, Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 619 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1980).
43. 619 F.2d at 806-07 and Appellant's Opening Brief at 19-27.
44. ld. at 806 and Appellant's Opening Brief at 21-43.
45. ld. at 804-05 and Appellee's Opening Brief at 21-43.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss1/11

6

Anderson: Indian Law

1981]

INDIAN LAW

311

In resolving the Navajo contentions concerning the executive order reservations, the Ninth Citcuit upheld the district
court's finding that the overriding purpose of the Act was to
consolidate ownership of the reservation lands.48 The Ninth Circuit also noted that the executive orders cited by the Navajo did
not specifically mention granting title to the Navajo Tribe!' The
court, therefore, held that all the executive order reservations
were meant to be included in the 1934 Act, except for the 1882
reservation which was expressly excluded.48
The court next determined the tribes' respective property
interests by interpreting the legislative intent of the 1934 Act.49
The appellate court rejected the Hopi argument that the district
court's decision conflicted with real property conveyancing principles, and found that those principles have no application to
federal-Indian law, particularly when they conflict with the intent of Congress. llo SimiJarly, the court rejected the Hopi contention that the district court erred by being inconsistent with
Healing v. Jones. 1I1 The court stated that even if the district
court's holding was inconsistent, the legislative intent must
control.1I2
As to the legislative intent, the court found that the 1934
Act primarily concerned Navajo affairS.1IS The Hopi were directly
mentioned only in that section of the Act excluding the 1882
reservation.1I4 The court then relied on the district court's interpretation of the phrase "[alII ... lands ... are ... withdrawn
... for the benefit of the Navajo and such other Indians as may
already be located thereon,"1111 and found that it was not meant
to grant a one-half interest in the entire reservation to the
46. ld. at 804.
47.ld.
48. ld. at 804·05.
49. ld. at 806·08.
50. ld. at 806.
51. ld. at 806-07. In Healing v. Jones, the court noted that a 1958 statute withdrew
the lands described in the Executive Order of 1882. The court found the Hopi Tribe to
have an interest in all the land described in the Order, and the "other Indians" to have a
one-half interest in the land they occupied.
52. 619 F.2d at 807.
53. ld. at 806.
54.ld.
55. ld. Act of June 14, 1934, Pub. L. No. 352, 48 Stat. 961 (1934).
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Hopi. 1I6 On the basis of this interpretation, the court affirmed
that portion of the district court's finding that the Hopi interest
was limited to the areas they used, occupied or possessed prior
to the enactment of the 1934 Act. II'1 The appellate court, however, disagreed with the district court's finding that the Hopi
were entitled to only an undivided one-half interest in the areas
they used, occupied or possessed, and held that the Hopi have
an exclusive interest in those areas. liB To support this interpretation, the court again relied on the legislative intent behind the
1934 Act. Recognizing that Congress was not committed to exclusive tribal areas in 1934, the court reasoned that the intent to
limit Hopi interests to areas settled was "clear enough."IIS
This interpretation resulted in the finding that the Hopi
have an exclusive interests in those areas within the boundaries
of the 1934 Act that they had settled prior to its enactment,
with the residue being the exclusive interest of the Navajo
Tribe.60
The court then turned to the Hopi request to the district
court for an accounting of Navajo activities on land found to be
within Hopi interests.61 The Hopi contended that jurisdiction
for an accounting WBlS provided expressly and impliedly by the
1974 Act authorizing jurisdiction for the quiet title action and
that an accounting is an integral part of the partition authorized
by the Act.62 The court noted that jurisdiction to bring suit
against an Indian tribe requires the express consent of Congress,
and strictly interpreted the jurisdictional act.63 The court found
no express allowance for an accounting in the 1934 Act, although
there was such an alllowance made for the 1882 lands previously
partitioned.M The court held that an accounting was not authorized and added that an accounting would not clearly aid in the
quiet and peaceful enjoyment of the reservation lands.611
56. 619 F.2d at 806.
57. ld. at 807.
5S. ld. at 80S.
59.ld.
60.ld.
61. ld. at 8OS-09.
62. ld. at 80S. and Appellant's Opening Brief at 63-73.
63. 619 F.2d at 8OS-09.
64. ld. at 809.
65.ld.
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CRITIQUE

In reaching its holding in Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, the
Ninth Circuit relied solely upon the legislative intent behind the
Act of 1934. Had the dispute arisen between an Indian tribe and
the federal government, rather than between two tribes, the
court would have applied additional principles of federal-Indian
law which would have dictated a significantly different outcome. 66 Similarly, had the court applied federal-Indian law principles to the 1934 Act itself, rather than assuming the validity of
the Act, the result might have differed.6'1 The Ninth Circuit's decision effectively imposes the status quo Congress sought in 1934
on the reality of fifty years later.6s
.
The court's opinion demonstrates the failure of this Ninth
Circuit panel to apply federal-Indian law principles that have
evolved from federal versus tribe and state versus tribe issues to
the Navajo versus Hopi controversy,69 although their application
to an intertribal conflict appears appropriate, particularly when
the basis of the dispute is considered. The title conflict between
the two tribes is, like many legal disputes involving Indian
tribes, directly related to earlier acts by the federal govem66. The evolution of federal Indian law has resulted in the formulation of basic rules
for resolution of Indian disputes. Central to these rules is the theory of reserved rights,
which holds that powers of Indian tribes are not granted by Congress, but derive from
tribal sovereignty based on the original possession of the land. United States v. Winans,
198 U.S. 371 (1905). In addition, courts require that ambiguous provisions of treaties be
construed as the Indian signatories would have understood them. McClanahan v. State
Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 551-53
(1832). Ambiguous provisions are to be interpreted in a light most favorable to the Indians. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943). In interpreting treaties and statutes the purpose and circumstances surrounding the Act are to be considered in determining the legislative intent. Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248
U.S. 78, 87 (1918). Encompassing these principles is the status of the federal government
as a trustee to the Indians. As a trustee it is incumbent upon the government to protect
Indian interest in land as well as education and welfare. See also Carter, Race and Power
as Aspects of Federal Guardianship Over American Indians: Land Related Cases 18871924, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 197 (1976) for a discussion of federal guardianship theory.
67. The court did not question the validity of the 1934 Act, although the misconceptions surrounding the settling of the Navajo in the Hopi territory were noted in Healing
v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. at 146-57.
68. The court acknowledged the legislative intent behind the 1934 Act to preserve
the status quo of the existing arrangement of the two tribes. 619 F.2d at 808. By enforcing the status quo of 1934 upon the Hopi, the court in effect precluded any expansion
and tribal growth and in fact withdrew land that the tribe was currently using.
69. See note 67 supra.
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ment.'10 In analyzing C\ll'rent legal issues which arise from earlier
federal-tribal transactions, it is appropriate and necessary to apply federal-Indian law principles to the consideration of the earlier acts which resulted in the present controversy. To view a
title dispute between two tribes as strictly an intertribal affair,
and thereby encourago intertribal conflict would appear to violate the guardianship lrole assumed by the federal government.'1l
E.

CONCLUSION

The reluctance of the Ninth Circuit to more fully apply federal-Indian law principles retards the development of the body
of federal-Indian law and results in a distprtion of the problem.
Unfortunately, it may also serve to postpone any actual resolution of the dispute, alld increase the possibility of a confrontation between the tribos outside the legal system.

Thomas M. Anderson*

II. DISTRIBUTION OF INDIAN HEALTH CARE
BENEFITS
A.

INTRODUCTION

In Rincon Band 0/ Mission Indians v. Harris, l the Ninth
Circuit considered a dass action challenge to the Indian Health
Service's (IHS) distribution of funds and services. Plaintiff alleged that the IHS had violated its statutory and trust duties
and its obligation of equal protection by its disproportionately
low distribution of health service funds to Indians in California.2
In resolving the issue, the appellate court relied upon established federal Indian law principles and prior case law. The
court did not reach the trust or constitutional questions, how70. For an historical perspective of the evolution of this dispute, see Healing v.
Jones, 210 F. Supp. at 125-58.
71. See Carter, supra note 68.
• Fourth Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law.

1. 618 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Ferguson, J.; the other panel members were
Tang, J., and Curtis, D.J., sitting by designation).
2. ld. at 570.
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The IHS is a sub-agency in the Department of Health and
Human Services, formerly the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare." Funding for the ms is authorized by the Snyder
Act. 5 Enacted in 1921,. the Snyder Act proyides generally for
funding programs which benefit "Indians throughout the United
States .... "6 Further authorization for the ms was provided by
the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (mCIA).7 The mCIA
was passed in 1976 by Congress "in f11161Irnent of its special responsibility and legal obligation to the American Indian people
. . . ."8 It provides funding for health care services, including
professional personnel and facilities. Urban Indians are specifically provided for.9 The IHS is responsible for distributing Snyder Act and mCIA funds to establish and maintain health care
services and programs throughout the country/o
The Rincon Band of Mission Indians initiated this action in
federal district court against the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare and the ms, as a class action on behalf of Indians
residing in California. l1 Rincon Band alleged that the ms's allocation of services was inadequate to meet the needs of their
tribe and other California Indians.12 In Rincon 'Band of Mission
Indians v. Califano,13 the tribe sought a declaratory judgment
that the ms services allocation violated the constitutional right
of equal protection of Indians residing in California.
In a motion for summary judgment, the Rincon Band ar3.ld.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2001 (1976); 20 U.S.C. § 3508 (Supp. ill 1979).
5. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1976) states in relevant part: "The Bureau of Indian Affairs,
under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, shall direct, supervise, and expend
such moneys as Congress may from time to time appropriate, for the benefit, care, and
assistance of the Indians throughout the United States ••••"
6. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1976). The district court noted that the benefits at issue qualified
as a constitutionally based entitlement. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. Califano, 464
F. Supp. 934, 939 n.6 (N.D. Cal 1979) (per Renfrew, D.J.).
7. 25 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976).
8. ld. § 1602.
9. ld. § 1601.
10. 618 F.2d at 570; 25 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
11. 464 F. Supp. 934, 935 n.l.
12. ld. at 935.
13. 464 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal 1979) (per Renfrew, D.J.).
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gued that the evidence showed that HEW (through the IHS),
had not only failed in its responsibility to provide health care
services to Indians in California, but had distributed funds in a
manner that deprived the California Indians of services comparable to those services provided Indians in other parts of the
country. I" These actions were argued to be an IHS violation of
equal protection of law as guaranteed by the fifth amendment.lll
In its cross-motiOlo. for summary judgment, HEW asserted
that Congress' failure to approve IHS's request for additional
funding beyond the IHS budget appropriation, constituted ratification of the established IHS allocation procedure. I6 HEW also
argued that the allocation system used by IHS was rationally
based and not in violation of the equal protection clause.1'7
The district court rejected defendant's claim of congressional ratification.IS RHlying on the Rules of the House of Representatives and case law, the court held that ratification of an
agency's policies does not occur through appropriations unless
express language to that effect is included in the appropriating
legislation.I9 Since IHS's argument was based on implied rather
than express ratification, the district court found its obligation
to rationally and equitably distribute Snyder Act funds undiminished by congrElssional refusal to provide additional
funding. 20
In considering the rationality of the allocation system used
by the IHS, the district court reviewed IHS fund allocation and
expenditure records. The court noted that approximately ten
percent of the IHS national services population resided on or
near reservations in California. However, the IHS had allocated
no more than 1.93 % of its total funds to California in any year
since 1956. The records further indicated that only 0.35 % of the
total IHS funding for health facilities over a seven year period
beginning in 1979 were allocated·to California Indians.21
14. Id.
15.Id.
16.Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19.Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.

at 936.
at 937-38.
at 936-37.
at 937.
at 936.
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The allocation criteria used by the IHS for distribution of
resources were determined by the district court to be "no more
than a bureaucratic charade . . . ."22 The IHS employed the
seemingly sophisticated Resource Allocation Criteria (RAC) to
index the actual needs of Indians throughout the nation. In fact,
RAC was only applied in the distribution of approximately three
percent of the allocated funds. The insufficiency of data called
the reliability of these distributions into question/'s Moreover,
the use of the RAC was not initiated until 1978, and the court
was provided with no explanation for the prior disproportionate
allocations.U
The district court granted Rincon Band's motion for summary judgment, finding that IHS's allocation system violated
the California Indians' right to equal protection of the law.25 In
a subsequent clarification, the court declared that "[i]n accordance with this conclusion, defendants are obligated to adopt a
program for providing health services to Indians in California
which is comparable to those offered Indians elsewhere in the
United States."n
B.

NINTH

CmcUIT

OPINION

The Secretary of HEW appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, reasserting that IHS allocations were immune
from attack because of congressional ratification through action
on its funding request.2'l Rincon Band reasserted that IHS allocation criteria was not only a denial of equal protection but also
a violation of the statutory and trust duties of the federal government to the Indians.28
The Ninth Circuit rejected defendant's claim of immunity .
based upon congressional ratification because the argument was
unsupported by law or fact. There was no showing that Congress
expressly intended that the failure to appropriate additional
funds to the IHS was meant to ratify their allocation procedures,
22. Id. at
23. Id. at
24. Id. at
25. Id. at

937.
937-38.
938-39.
939.
26. 618 F.2d 569, 570.
27. Id. at 573-74.
2B. Id. at 570 & 575 n.B.
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and case law and congressional rules prohibit ratification of an
agency's procedures by implication.29
The appellate court reviewed the district court's findings of
fact, using the figures most favorable to the government. In part,
its findings were that California Indians had received a disproportionately low share of ms allocations.8o By the most generous estimate, only sellen percent of the IHS's allocation of
IHCIA funds since 1978 was appropriated to California Indians,
although ten percent of the national service population of
518,000 resided in California. Other findings revealed that less
than 0.6% of professional health care personnel were assigned to
California and, that of the fifty-one hospitals, ninety-nine health
care centers, and several hUndred health stations nationally,
California Indians were served by only one hospital and two
health care centers.81
In considering the rationality of ms's allocation criteria,
the court viewed the agency's obligation in the light of Morton v.
Ruiz.82 At issue in Ruiz, as in Rincon Band, was the reasonableness of procedures employed by government agencies for distribution of funds and services to Indians.88 The Snyder Act, the
primary authority for Indian benefit programs, contains no provisions for eligibility or distribution of allocated funds. M The
Supreme Court in Ruiz held that the Secretary of the Interior
was responsible for establishing reasonable and proper eligibility
standards.85 Relying on Ruiz, the Ninth Circuit inferred that an
agency's distribution (:riteria must be rationally aimed at an equitable distribution of its funds. 86 This conclusion was consistent
both with established federal Indian law principles and a prior
Ninth Circuit case requiring due process in termination of a
benefit program for llndians.87
29. Id. at 573-74.
30. Id. at 571.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 572 (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974».

33.
34.
35.
36.

415 U.S. 199 (1974).
See 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1976), 8upra note 5.
415 U.S. at 230-31.
618 F.2d at 572.
37. Id. at 572; Fox v. Morton, 505 F.2d 254, 255 (9th Cir. 1974). The evolution of
federal Indian law has developed basic rules for the resolution of disputes involving Native Americans. These principles are founded on the theory that the power of Indian
tribes is not granted by Congress, but derives from original possession of the land by the
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The appellate panel, relying principally upon the district
court's factual determination, also concluded that the IHS's distribution criteria was not rationally based. 88 The insufficiency of
data available to apply the agency's RAC method of establishing
need was a major consideration in the court's conclusion.89
Holding that the IHS breached its statutory duty under the
Snyder Act, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the California Indians.40 Having decided that the IHS violated its statutory duty, the court found it
unnecessary to reach the trust or equal protection issues!l

C.

SIGNIFICANCE

The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Rincon Band expands the
obligations of administrative agencies responsible for allocating
Snyder Act funds. While the IHS, as a distributor of Snyder Act
funds, had established administrative procedures for the disbursement of funds, the court nevertheless undertook to examine the substance of those procedures to determine if they
were "rationally aimed at an equitable distribution of funds. "42
Basing their analysis on Ruiz and federal-Indian law principles,
the court determined that "rational" distribution procedures
were not enough. Distribution procedures must also be equitable. 48 The equitable requirement stems from federal Indian law
principles which require an overriding duty of fairness when
dealing with Indians,44 and a liberal construction of legislation
that benefits Indians.45
The Snyder Act, like the IHCIA, is phrased in general
terms, and the administrative limitations imposed upon the IHS
Indians. United States v. Winans, 19B U.S. 371 (1905).
3B. 61B F.2d at 573.
39. ld. at 572.
40. ld. at 575.
41. ld. at 570, 575 n.B.
42. ld. at 572.
43.ld.
44. 415 U.S. at 236; Board of County Comm'rs v. Sever, 31B U.S. 705 (1943); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942); Fox v. Morton, 505 F.2d 254, 255
(9th Cir. 1974).
45. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 31B U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Ruiz v. Morton,
462 F.2d BIB, B21 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd Bub nom. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974);
Fox v. Morton, 505 F.2d 254, 255 (9th Cir. 1974).
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by these acts is minimal.46 Yet, the court significantly chose to
closely examine the IHS's internal procedure with regard to Indian law principles, aftHr it had already determined the criteria
used by the agency was not rational. The result was a clarification and expansion of administrative standards for agencies
working with Indian benefit funds.
Also significant was the court's determination not to reach
the constitutional issue. Although the district court held that
the IHS violated equal protection rights of California Indians;''l
the Ninth Circuit's decision- rested entirely on IHS's failure to
meet statutory requirements, thus eliminating the necessity of
discussing the equal protection issue.48 This is notable in that an
equal protection analysis of IHS~s procedure could have raised
questions of Snyder Act validity.49
The court's opinio]rl assumed the validity of IHCIA and the
Snyder Act. However, since the Supreme Court decision in Regents of the Unil)ersity of California v. Bakke,f5O programs which
benefit a specific class on the sole basis of race are subject to
strict constitutional analysis. Legislation benefitting Indians has
been held not to involve a racial classification, but to be based
upon the political status of Indian tribes as semi-sovereign political bodies. f51 However, the Snyder Act and the IHCIA were enacted to benefit Indian people generaily.f52 Eligibility for benefits
is not limited to critE~ria of tribal affiliation, reservation residence, or other politicul indentification. f5S The nature of elibility
for these programs thus appears to be based primarily on a racial classification. Since entitlements to Snyder Act benefits
have not been restrictE~d to Indians identifiable through political
status, the issue of impermissible racial classification remains in46. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1976); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1675 (1976).
47. 464 F. Supp. at 939.
48. 618 F.2d at 575.
49. See Crystal & Johnson, Indians and Equal Protection, 54 WASH. L. REv. 587
(1979).
50. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
51. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-54 (1974).
52. See notes 5 & 7 supra.
53. The Snyder Act does not define the word "Indian." The IHCIA defines "Indian"
with broad classification criteria ending with including as an Indian any person that "(3)
is considered by the Secretary of the Interior to be an Indian for any purpose, or (4) is
determined to be an Indian under regulation promulgated by the Secretary." 25 U.S.C.
§ 1603 (1976).
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herent in any Snyder Act litigation.
By choosing not to discuss the constitutional issue, the
Ninth Circuit may have intentionally avoided the question of racially based Indian benefit program validity in a post Bakke ruling. The Ninth Circuit's decision does, however, contribute to
the resolution of some immediate problems in inequitable federal agency administration of Indian benefit programs.
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